The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an emerging regional organization of economic integration in the post-Soviet space. Following the limited success of previous integration attempts, it seeks to pursue deeper integration, borrowing features from the EU.
Introduction
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it has identified a number of features thereof, the main being "its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves". 9 Such autonomy is also confirmed in the decisions of courts and constitutional control bodies of certain EU Member States, however not without limits. 10 To accommodate the features of that autonomy, a number of countries had to introduce changes to their constitutions or adopt separate constitutional acts.
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This article unpacks the legal changes that accompanied the creation of the new entity and explores whether they ensure the effective functioning of the EAEU, and whether the respective legal order has the prerequisites of autonomy similar to that of the EU. The paper adopts the systemic method of analysis proposed by Sørensen. 12 The essence of the method is to engage with the organization in its entirety by examining, both individually and in their interplay the organizational structure and competence; institutions and their functioning; specific features of lawmaking; the application of the law; and dispute resolution. Therefore, the legal order of the EAEU is explored by gradually revealing its nature, institutional structure and functioning, legal system and the ability of the EAEU Court to protect and enforce it. This analysis is the beginning of an inquiry,
given the early stages of the development of the organization, and absence of considerable practice to analyze and rely on. This article, nevertheless, gives an essential overview of the preconditions and hints at the direction such practice may take. 
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The EAEU and its Institutions
The EAEU Treaty defines the EAEU as an international organization of regional economic integration that shall have an international legal personality (Art.1(2) of the EAEU Treaty) 13 .
Therefore, it is clear that the integration pursued is economic, which means, that non-economic integration (e.g., political, cultural, social, etc.) is beyond the EAEU framework and will probably develop by means of other agreements, other organizations, or by amending the Treaty in the future.
The economic focus of the integration is additionally underlined by the absence of an inherently political parliamentary body within the EAEU, even though this was envisaged in the first draft of the treaty. 14 No other bodies for citizen participation are envisaged either, which, taken together, shows a crucial conceptual difference from the EU. However, as evidenced by practice of regional integration, economic integration can gradually "spill over" into other fields. Consequently, the organization can, in principle, transform into an organization of a wider competence.
The "regional" component of integration normally limits the possibility for the organization to expand within specific geographical boundaries. Even though the EAEU Treaty does not specify this area, one can deduce the region of Eurasia. However, there are different understandings of "Eurasia" in social sciences, 15 the most common, also used within this contribution, is Eurasia as the post-Soviet space. At the same time, it is not entirely clear if the drafters had the same thing in mind. In addition, the provisions on accession to the organization do not mention Eurasia as a region where a state should belong (Art.24(1) EAEU Treaty). This is different from the EU, where there is a clear geographical criterion of accession, where only European states can become EU members (Art.49 TEU).
The explicit reference to the EAEU's international legal personality has most likely been inserted to preclude speculations, which, for example, took place regarding legal personality of the European Communities and the EU during the initial stages of their development. 16 International law doctrine suggests that legal personality depends on an organization's constitutional status, actual powers and practice, significant factors being "the capacity to enter into relations with states and other organizations and conclude treaties with them, and the status it has been given under This structure, even though to a certain degree similar to that of the EU, is not entirely comparable and it is a difficult task to clearly identify the corresponding institutions. One of the most striking differences is the structure and composition of the EAEU Commission. The official EAEU web-site describes the Commission as "a permanent supranational regulatory body of the Union". 22 The Commission (together with its predecessor, the Commission of the Customs Union)
is therefore the first institution in the post-Soviet space to be officially deemed supranational.
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However, even though the EAEU Commission indeed possesses certain supranational features, it clearly lacks others, which diminishes the supranational effect. 24 In fact, the very first principle under which the Commission operates reveals the intergovernmental elements of this institution: it shall ensure mutual benefit, equality and respect for the national interests of the Member States (point 2 Commission Regulation, emphasis added), rather than interests of the Union.
Moreover, it is not even entirely correct to analyze the Commission as one institution. It is rather an organization within an organization, which has an institutional and decision-making structure of its own. 25 Therefore, it is difficult to refer to the body as a whole as a supranational one, Even though it is possible to identify broad correspondences between EAEU and EU institutions, EAEU decision-making is decisively different from that in the EU. EU decisionmaking is primarily based on a legislative process involving several institutions, where the European Commission has executive functions and virtually exclusive proposal-making competence. 28 In the EAEU each institution adopts its own acts separately. There has been an improvement upon previous post-Soviet systems, where the decisions adopted at the lowest levels of the institutional structure needed the approval of the highest institution. The change is plausible;
however, there is still a system in place, which can undermine independence and supranationality.
The system is informally called "the Belarusian elevator". 29 The substance of the procedure is that any decision adopted at a lower level of the institutional structure can potentially be challenged at a higher level of the institutional ladder, up to the highest level of the Supreme Council (Art.12 and 16 EAEU Treaty). Given that first, all of the following levels are intergovernmental in terms of their composition and unanimous decision-making, and second, Member States can also initiate the challenge, the Member States remain in control of the decision-making process, backed by what is essentially a veto power. Evidently, this system has been built to ensure that the interests of the Member States are preserved. However, it hardly allows the Commission, or its parts, to be autonomous actors in the integration process. 27 The Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council were grouped into one slot as they were previously used to be two formations of one institution, and the Intergovernmental Council also takes the role of the Supreme Council when it is not in session. 29 The notion has been picked from the presentation of the head of the Eurasian Integration Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus Mr. Viktar Šych at the seminar "Challenges of the integration on the way to the Eurasian Economic Union" that took place on 10 December 2013 in Minsk. The reason for the notion is that the system was proposed by the Belarusian side to the negotiations, to which the other members agreed.
"The Law of the Union"
The EAEU Treaty provides for the notion of the "law of the Union", which is not defined, but according to Article 6, consists of the EAEU Treaty itself, international agreements in the EAEU framework, international agreements of the EAEU with third parties, as well as decisions and orders of the EAEU institutions. Recommendations, not being obligatory, do not form part of the law of the Union.
The decisions of the EAEU Commission, as provided by the Treaty, are the only acts that have a normative character and are directly applicable on the territory of Member States. This underlines once again the supranational features of the Commission Board and adds a supranational feature to the intergovernmental Commission Council. However, it is limited in the latter as long as the acts of the Commission Council are adopted by unanimity. In contrast, the intergovernmental Council of the EU uses qualified majority voting in most cases.
The major innovation within the law of the EAEU is the principle of direct applicability. 30 In most of the previous cases, to have legal effect, the acts had to be implemented using national procedures. Now, certain acts do not require any implementation procedures and in theory become part of national law immediately.
As mentioned above, direct effect 31 is one of the main features of the autonomous legal order of the EU. Directly effective norms are regarded as the law of the land in the Member States in the application of EU law. An important part of this feature is that individuals can directly apply such norms in national courts. The courts, in their turn, are obliged to apply such norms as if they were adopted by domestic legislative bodies. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 39 ratified international treaties have priority over national laws and are directly applicable except when the application of an international treaty requires the promulgation of a law. Such norms become part of domestic law (Art.4(1) and 4(3) Kazakhstani Constitution). 40 Consequently, in the same vein the EAEU Treaty is also part of the national law of Kazakhstan. Moreover, the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan is consistent in maintaining the priority of ratified international treaties over national laws.
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The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan stipulates that "international treaties to which the Kyrgyz Republic is a party that have entered into force … and also the universally recognized principles and norms of international law shall be the constituent part of the legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic" (Art.6(3) Kyrgyzstani Constitution). 42 The same provision is stipulated in the Law "On
International Treaties of the Kyrgyz Republic". 43 However, it seems that only international treaties on human rights are given direct effect and they also take precedence over other international treaties (Art.6(3) Kyrgyzstani Constitution international agreements have the force of the act by which Belarus has agreed to the obligation (Art.33(2) of the Law). Therefore, according to these rules, the EAEU Treaty, which was ratified by a national law, could in principle become lower in status than a future new act of national legislation. There is nothing to prevent the rule lex posterior derogat anterior discussed above.
As The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has delivered a ruling that it has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of decisions of the Commission, based on human rights concerns and foundations of constitutional order. 48 The legal force of decisions of international organizations in the Belarusian legal system can be deduced from the competence of the Constitutional Court to deliver opinions on the conformity of acts of international institutions to the Constitution, international agreements ratified by Belarus, and laws and decrees of the President (Art.116(4) Constitution of Belarus). Therefore, the acts of international institutions are hierarchically lower than these. Previously, it even followed from Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, 49 that acts of international institutions (including international agreements of Belarus) could be unilaterally found inapplicable by the Constitutional Court. However, the new Law on Constitutional Legal Procedure 50 no longer has this provision and provides that when an international obligation or the act of an international entity contradicts certain legal acts, the relevant state authorities take measures to terminate the participation of Belarus in such an international agreement or to terminate the obligatory nature of such an act, or introduce changes therein (paras 7 and 8 of Art.85 of the Law). Arguably, these new provisions are aimed at ameliorating the constitutional rules mentioned above with a view to taking a more favorable stance towards Belarus' participation in the EAEU. However, these changes fall short of changing the dependency direction-according to domestic law, the decisions of EAEU institutions remain dependent on national legislation.
This analysis shows that not all Member States' legal orders are necessarily compatible with the EAEU framework. However, this is mainly relevant for the full effect of Union law, while it is not necessarily relevant for the autonomy of Union law. 51 Therefore, in order to ensure its effectiveness, either national constitutional norms have to be changed or the EAEU Treaty amended or the EAEU Court should come up with EU-like doctrines to effectuate Union law in the national legal orders of Member States in order to preserve the legal order of the EAEU. The latter option, being in principle devoid of the political conundrum inherent to the former ones, is however, no less challenging as will be seen below. We now turn to the discussion of the ability of the EAEU Court to ensure the functioning of the EAEU legal order.
The EAEU Court as the guardian of the EAEU legal order?
The EAEU Court's aim is to ensure the uniform application of the law of the Union by EAEU law: to preserve the uniform interpretation of EU law and the effective functioning of the legal order itself. However, it also goes beyond that purpose in order to protect individual rights given that the EU is "based on the rule of law" and that its founding Treaty establishes "a complete system of legal remedies". 52 Through this procedure, the national courts of EU Member States and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are integrated into one system of judicial supervision. The supremacy and direct applicability of EU law enables any natural or legal person to challenge actions of their own Member States against EU law, also when there are limits of direct access of individuals to the CJEU. This is in stark contrast to the EAEU, where, apart from Member States, only "economic entities" have direct access to the EAEU Court (para 39 Statute of the Court), and no preliminary ruling procedure is available. By contrast, the preliminary ruling, however limited, was available in the EURASEC, even though it was used only once.
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The ECJ and the national courts of EU Member States use this proceeding widely. role over time. 57 Moreover, it has been found that Member States tend to comply with the decisions of the ECJ. 58 There is no such procedure in the EAEU, where only Member States can file actions against other Member States for non-compliance. The Commission is deprived of such a function, which was, however limited, available before. This is a clear rollback in supranationality and is definitely a weak point in the judicial control and effective functioning of the legal order; even more so as EU practice shows that Member States rarely file actions against each other out of fear of retaliation and prefer a political resolution of differences. 59 There are other limitations to the EAEU Court. There is a provision, according to which the Court does not have power to create competences for EAEU institutions in addition to those explicitly provided in the treaties (para 42 Statute of the Court). Arguably, the purpose of this rule is to limit the ability of the Court to find the implied powers of the organization, to a large extent the way the CJEU did in case of the EU, 60 and International Court of Justice-in case of the United Nations. 61 Another limiting provision is that the Court's decisions do not change and (or) invalidate the norms of EAEU law and national law which are in force and the Court does not create new ones (para 102 Statute of the Court). Neither of the provisions existed in the EAEU Court's predecessor the EURASEC Court. There could be at least three factors which played a role in introducing the provision. First, borrowing from the CJEU, the previous EURASEC Court took an activist attitude from the very start. 62 Such was the position taken by the court that the Russian international law specialist Ispolinov classified it a "new-style institution of international justice". 63 He claims that one of its very first judgments-Iuzhnii Kuzbass 64 -has become the first judicial activism case in the post-Soviet space. 65 Treaty interpretation was much more extensive than the textual provisions.
In particular, while the relevant EURASEC legal acts did not explicitly provide the EURASEC removed by a unanimous vote of the judges themselves (excluding the judge under consideration) and Advocates General (Art.6 CJEU Statute). In addition, unlike the CJEU, the EAEU Court allows for dissenting opinions, which makes public who the dissenters are. The EAEU Court system can therefore put pressure on the judges and compromise their independence.
These striking provisions and the differences with the CJEU lead to the conclusion that it will be a hard task for the EAEU Court to ensure uniform application of the law of the Union. The
Constitutional Court of Russia has already voiced its differences in approaches with regard to the EAEU Court. 69 The latest ruling of the Constitutional Court, regarding the decisions of the 
Conclusion
An analysis of the EAEU shows that the new organization is an interesting development in the postSoviet space which requires further research, especially when more practical implementation becomes available, on both the EAEU and national level. In principle, there are a number of features of the new legal order which could promote further integration in the post-Soviet area. The EAEU has the power to adopt decisions binding upon Member States; certain institutions that adopt such decisions are not fully dependent on the cooperation of all Member States; there is direct applicability for at least one type of legal act; and the EAEU has certain power to enforce its decisions.
It is, however, clear that there are multiple gaps, which shows how the new legal order lags behind the autonomy of the EU legal order. Even the claimed supranational features that the EAEU possesses are quite limited. For instance, the binding nature of the decisions of the EAEU Commission and their direct applicability stumbles upon different national legal systems, making it possible for Member States to "circumvent" this binding character. The institutions are largely dependent on the cooperation of all Member States, as decisions can be overturned because of the "Belarusian elevator" decision-making system. This leads to the conclusion that the EAEU remains largely an intergovernmental organization.
One of the major differences between the development of the institutional structures of the EU and the EAEU is that in the former there appears to be a balance between the supranational and intergovernmental bodies. Eurasian integration took another path, creating a vertical institutional structure; with the EAEU, this vertical dependence has been reduced, but not eliminated.
The EAEU Court will struggle to enforce its jurisdiction as the institution powers have become less far-reaching than its predecessor's (the EURASEC Court). There are fewer types of proceedings it is capable to adjudicate. The drafters of the EAEU Treaty were also careful to limit the scope for CJEU-like judicial activism. From this it can be concluded that only with difficulty will the EAEU Court be able to achieve its main aim as provided in the Treaty, and to ensure the autonomy of the legal order.
It is clear that the institutional system set out in the EAEU Treaty is there to preserve the interests of all Member States. However, some innovative legal features coupled with the enthusiasm of the judges of the preceding court, who remained in the job in the EAEU Court, can play an integrative role in practice and potentially develop a viable autonomous legal order.
Therefore, the implementation of the EAEU Treaty and the acts derived from it, together with their enforcement, will show the real value of the ongoing integration process.
